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LAW DAY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT
PROPOSALS TO CURTAIL THE SUPREME COURT*
CHARLES A. HORSKY**
On May first of this year, by proclamation of the President,.
the people of the United States celebrated "Law Day." It is no
accident, of course, that Law Day in the United States falls on the
day on which world communism traditionally celebrates the idea
of revolution. That coincidence, however, requires that we recog-
nize and define what kind of law it is which we are honoring.
There are laws in the Soviet Union, in Hungary, in Cuba, which no
doubt people are obeying. The Czar and the Kaiser enforced laws,
as did the Caesars of Rome. But I take it that we are talking about
something different. I take it that we are talking of laws based on
the consent of the people-the laws of a government in which the
governed are also the governors, a government of the people, by the
people and for the people.
That, at least, is our tradition. Alexander Hamilton, in the
Federalist Papers, remarked that:
it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by
their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establish-
ing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they
are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions
on accident and force.2
Fortunately, Mr. Hamilton was not wholly correct. We are no
longer the only people who have undertaken to establish good
government by their own choice, rather than to accept the dictates
of force or of history. Not only the nations of Western Europe
and of the British Commonwealth, but also many new govern-
ments in Asia, Africa and South America have likewise committed
themselves to the idea of government, and law, based on reflec-
tion and choice. For these people our progress, our law, have been
a major inspiration. For them, by the same token, a weakening
of our own faith, a doubt as to our own ultimate success, will be
a major tragedy. We now have, whether we would wish it so or not,
a responsibility not only to ourselves but to the whole free world.
It is in this light that I would direct my thoughts. How well, by
our "conduct and example," to use Hamilton's phrase, are we now
carrying out this vital experiment of law based on the consent and
*The substance of this paper was delivered as a speech at the University
of Minnesota Law School Alumni Banquet on April 29, 1958.
**Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Proc. No. 3321, 23 Fed. Reg. 821 (1958).
2. The Federalist No. 1, at 1 (Tudor ed. 1947) (Hamilton).
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restraint of those who live under it? How well are we, and our
laws, measuring up to the ideas which this Nation once held to be
self-evident? Daniel Webster's famous toast was "The Law: It has
honored us, may we honor it." The honor we can best accord is not
simple eulogy. We honor it far more by examining how far we are
maintaining the conditions which are a prerequisite to the very
existence of law itself.
On that score we can be anything but complacent. We say we
believe in law. We dedicate a day to its honor, by formal proclama-
tion of our President. That proclamation recites that it is individual
freedom under law which distinguishes our system of government
from the slavery which exists under communism.8 Yet, day by day,
we hear many voices that seem to be subversive of law. We hear a
distinguished conservative Senator call for "massive resistance."
We hear a Governor invite such resistance to the order of a federal
court. We find a Chief judge of one of our states writing that
certain decisions of the Supreme Court-unanimous ones, as it
happens--"are entitled to no respect and obedience any time or
anywhere." Indeed, we have the spectacle of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Senate voting to report favorably a
bill which would remove a portion of the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Not since the unhappy days of the Reconstruc-
tion era and Ex parte McCardle,4 almost a century ago, has Con-
gress taken such action.
As symptomatic as the Committee's favorable report on this
bill is another related action. There has recently been published a
thirteen page document which is entitled, The Supreme Court as
an Instrument of Global Conquest.5 It is described as a study by
"SPX Research Associates." There is no further identification of
the authorship, nor of who or what "SPX Research Associates"
may be. It is, to say the least, a disturbing document.
It is disturbing because it is a most appalling and distorted
piece of writing. It seeks to show that the Supreme Court is an
instrument of the communist conspiracy-wittingly or unwittingly
is left an open question. The pattern of Supreme Court cases, it
asserts, fits the Communist Party line. Referring to decisions which
range from Brown v. Board of Educatio.6 and Shelley v. Kramer7
3. See note 1, supra.
4. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
5. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Administration
of Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 2646, Appendix IV,
Part 2 (1958).
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to Cole v. Young8 and Service v. Dutiles, the document concludes:
In the paralytic effect of its pro-Communist decisions, on States
and Federal agencies of internal security, the United States
Supreme Court is the most powerful, and potentially determina-
tive, instrument of the Communist global conquest by paralysis.10
It is equally disturbing that this intemperate and unprincipled at-
tack on the Supreme Court should be printed for general circula-
tion as a separate document of the Committee on the Judiciary of
the United States, and without comment on or criticism of its
content.
These items I have mentioned are no more than symptomatic.
They suggest-perhaps more accurately they warn-that we are
forgetting that law, as we know it, is the supreme exercise of self-
discipline.
We must also remember that there is an aspect of our own
legal heritage which imposes on us a peculiar burden of responsi-
bility. We have, in America, given a new exaltation to the power
of the judiciary. We have accorded to our courts the power to
invalidate the acts of those who are more directly responsible to
the people's will. Both de Toqueville and Bryce have remarked
that in our polity scarcely a question arises which does not be-
come, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate. Our courts are
rightly regarded as the ultimate embodiment of our law, yet they
are necessarily a part, indeed perhaps the ultimate part, of the
procedure by which we resolve our most fundamental political
questions.
We are so accustomed to this that we regard it not only as
natural but as necessary. Yet, we might think. for a moment, of the
nature of a possible Law Day in England. That country shares
with us our tradition of the common law. Its Magna Charta is our
Magna Charta. Due process of law, personal freedoms, the rights
of the individual to liberty of mind and spirit which we cherish, are
equally cherished there. Yet, the guardian of those rights in Eng-
land is not the judiciary, but the House of Commons, restrained
only by the suspensive but not the veto power of the House of
Lords. Law Day in London would properly honor not only the
Chancellors and the Chief Justices, but likewise the political repre-
sentatives of the people elected and assembled in the Houses of
Parliament.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
8. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
9. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
10. See note 5, supra at p. 1081.
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My point, however, is not that we should reexamine Marbury
v. Madison." What is important is that we recognize the additional
stresses to which our system subjects our courts and, in the sense in
which we now use it, our law. Our judges personify law and
the rule of law. We owe them the same honor we owe the law
itself. Yet, we impose on them the role of a super-legislator on
almost every major question of our day.
One consequence of this is the unhappy equation of wisdom
and constitutionality. The restraint which lies at the foundation of
law in a republic is assumed to exist when constitutional boundaries
are not overstepped. And, of equal importance, a decision by the
courts that the law is constitutionally valid is taken by many to be
conclusive evidence that it is proper and even necessary.
But the more important consequence, and the one which brings
me back to the recent actions with which I began, is the extent to
which the courts are plunged into the partisanship and deep feeling
which exist on our political and social problems. Whenever our
courts pass judgment on such questions, there will be those who
disagree with the decisions, and when emotions are deeply stirred
the disagreement will be deeply felt. It is our responsibility, how-
ever, if we are to maintain the law as we know it, to distinguish
between dissent, even vigorous dissent, and acts of hoodlumism
which would warp and ultimately destroy our legal heritage.
The registry of dissent to law is a part of the process of gov-
ernment by the consent of the governed. Responsible criticism of
particular court decisions is, like a dissenting opinion, a reasoned
appeal to some future court majority to adopt a different position.
Since the courts, at least in the federal system, do not directly con-
front the electorate, serious discussion of their work provides al-
most the only reliable evaluation of how well they are performing
it. One cannot but welcome the recent lectures of judge Learned
Hand on the Bill of Rights,'= for example, whether one agrees with
him or not.
Indeed, I would not be particularly disturbed even were dissent
to go beyond words to invoke Thoreau's theory of civil dis-
obedience to resist peacefully some particular law or court deci-
sion. One way of dissent is to say, in effect, "I consider this law
wrong and unjust. I recognize it to be the law, but I will not obey
it. I accept the alternative of going to jail in protest, in the hope
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
12. The Oliver Wendell Holmes' Lectures delivered by judge Hand
at the Harvard Law School, published as The Bill of Rights (1958).
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of persuading public opinion to change it." Abolitionists did that
in protest against the fugitive slave law. Negroes in Montgomery,
Alabama, did that in protest against a bus segregation law. This is
not defiance, but a solemn act of vicarious suffering to prick the
general conscience to amendment or repeal.
But, while it is vital that we preserve the freedom to dissent
against a law, it is equally vital that we distinguish between dissent
and subversion. In a government whose laws are not based on the
consent and restraint of the people, dissent usually has to take the
form of conspiracy to overthrow the government. No process other
than the conspiratorial is available.
We do not need conspiracies. The foundation of the democratic
experiment upon which we have embarked is the belief that men
are capable of governing themselves, as Hamilton said, by reflec-
tion and choice. Consistent with that belief we cannot treat the
law as an alien force, which we can but obey, evade, or try to
overthrow by force. Once we accept that attitude, we will truly be
conspirators against the law whenever we disagree with it. Once
we equate disagreement with conspiracy, we will make it a con-
spiracy. And if we let this happen, we will have taken on the worst
trait of the adversary with whom we are contending in the world.
The habit of treating those with whom we disagree as con-
spirators now goes very deep in public life. That, for example,
seemed to me to be the root evil of what we remember as McCar-
thyism. I have no doubt myself that innocent people were injured
by false charges, but the greater damage was the facile equation
of dissent and conspiracy. I find the same pattern in attacks on
some of those who suggest that there is room for improvement in
some practices of the Federal Bureau of :nvestigation, or who
criticize the loyalty-security program, or the Smith Act, or who
defend the Fifth Amendment.
I find it, too, in the conduct of both sides in the current racial
conflict in the South. The strident voices from that area are cry-
ing conspiracy and are waving documents to show that the Supreme
Court decisions are part of an international communist conspiracy.
On the other hand, many Negroes and northern white liberals
appear to regard all southern opposition to desegregation as a con-
spiracy against the Constitution and fundamental human rights.
This cold war going on in our midst produces little but propaganda
and counter-propaganda.
Somewhere, in all of this, we are losing respect for law, and
respect for the restraint without which law as we know it will
1958] 1109
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perish. I am as certain of that as I am uncertain of what can be
done to avoid it.
I am sure that the answer does not lie in the hands of lawyers
alone. Yet, we do have an ever-present responsibility for promot-
ing among our people an intelligent understanding of our constitu-
tional system. It seems readily apparent that there are substantial
segments of our population who do not understand that the Con-
stitution is a living and expanding document, and that, indeed, it
must be so. We cannot rest on the fact that the Supreme Court has
made its decision. Mr. justice Frankfurter was certainly right when
he said, more than thirty years ago, that "the real battles of
liberalism are not won in the Supreme Court," but through "a
persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts
and acts of the community." 13
To me, at least, it is particularly important that the controversy
which whips today around our courts concerns human rights. To
my mind, we should be proud that within our time the Supreme
Court has given new vitality to the constitutional safeguards which
the President's Law Day proclamation urges us to preserve and
strengthen-the aspects of human liberty which ensure freedom of
mind, freedom of conscience, freedom of the person, and equality
before the law. It is in these guarantees, to the extent that they are
made meaningful, that we can take pride.
It is no doubt true that we are still in the process of achieving
the high ideals articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment. A cen-
tury ago, they could not immediately be achieved-perhaps not
even approached. Plessy v. Ferguson,14 which was decided in 1896,
had not given us time to adjust from slavery to full practical recog-
nition of the principle of equal protection of the laws. Sixty years
have since elapsed. Continued adherence to the separate but equal
doctrine in 1954 would have been no better than moral drift. This
is not to minimize the complexity of the problems, social, economic
and psychological, which must be resolved. Nor is this to indict or
condemn the South, where the problems are concentrated but to
which they are by no means confined. The very magnitude of the
problems demand our highest and greatest efforts to resolve them
within the structure of our legal tradition.
Our responsibility as lawyers is even more directly involved in
meeting the challenge to the nature and function of the Supreme
Court. We must answer those who would strip from citizens a
protection which has existed since the first days of our Republic.
13. Frankfurter, Law and Politics 197 (1925).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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In its original form, the bill now pending in Congress would with-
draw from the Court appellate jurisdiction to review cases arising
from the investigative functions of Congress, the security program
of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, state anti-
subversive legislation, local governmental rules concerning sub-
versive activities of school teachers, and the admission of persons
to the practice of law within the several states. It is this last pro-
vision which the Senate Committee has already approved; more
may be approved later.
The proponents of this bill disagree with the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court in these several areas. We are all familiar
with the decisions, and with the difficulties of reconciling national
security and individual freedom. But the bill rests upon the assump-
tion that the American people are so lacking in democratic faith, in
basic loyalty, that they require for their own protection government
security measures that cannot withstand traditional constitutional
scrutiny by our highest court. I happen not -to share that assump-
tion, nor do I really believe the American people share that lack
of confidence in themselves.
Because we are lawyers we can more clearly understand that
this bill is, in the true sense, subversive of law itself. We are com-
mitted to our constitutional system, in which the courts stand as
the ultimate guardians of our fundamental rights. And in such a
system it is intolerable that we deny to the Supreme Court the
power to accord that protection when a case is presented. We can
understand that Supreme Court decisions can be changed, and,
indeed, have been changed. Sometimes it has required no more
than the amendment of a statute. Sometimes it has required an
amendment of the Constitution. Sometimes it has been done by an
overruling decision. But we subvert the basis upon which our law
is based if we seek to prevent its guarantees from being made
effective.
But what I would like to leave with you is not an answer, but
a question. We all want to see the triumph of law; we all rejoice
in what we call the majesty of law. Can we be complacent when,
among a part of our people, law is regarded with scorn and even
hate? Are we doing our part if we praise our Bill of Rights and
remain silent when proposals are made to deprive the Supreme
Court of the power to declare those rights infringed? As this
Nation celebrates its first Law Day, let us remember the words of
Thoreau, who said: "The law will never make men free; it is men
who have got to make the law free."
1958] 1111
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